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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Natu re of the Case 
Tesha Jowane Sunday appeals from her convictions for possession of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine) and possession of drug paraphernalia 
following a jury trial. On appeal, Ms. Sunday asserts that the evidence was insufficient 
to support the jury's finding of guilt with respect to the possession of a controlled 
substance (methamphetamine) charge. Additionally, she asserts that the district court 
erred when it refused to provide requested jury instructions concerning the union of act 
and intent and one clarifying the meaning of the term constructive possession. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Ms. Sunday was charged with possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine) (39170 R., pp.46-47) in a case that was consolidated with one 
involving misdemeanor charges of possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) 
and possession of drug paraphernalia. (39169 R., p.6.) The matter proceeded to a jury 
trial. (See generally Tr.) 
Testimony at trial established that police encountered Ms. Sunday in a home 
during the execution of a search warrant seeking evidence concerning forged or stolen 
checks.1 During a search of the master bedroom, police found several items of interest. 
On the bed, they found a wallet containing Ms. Sunday's identification. In a dresser 
1 The search warrant did not mention Ms. Sunday, and instead concerned a resident of 
the house named Paul Reid. (Tr.vol.l, p.197, Ls.16-21.) 
1 
drawer, they found a spoon with white residue on it,2 along with court paperwork in 
Ms. Sunday's name. On a camping chair in the bedroom, was a pack of "Camel 99's" 
cigarettes in which they found a baggie of suspected methamphetamine3 and a glass 
pipe with residue. 4 And, in the bedroom closet, they found "what appeared to be 
marijuana on one of the shelves .... " (TrVol.I,5 p.125, L.18 - p.139, L.23; State's 
Exhibit Nos. 1, 3, and 4 (photographs of the cigarette pack).) 
Detective Brockbank testified that Ms. Sunday was one of four or five people in 
the house when the warrant was executed, and that he learned from her that she had 
been staying in "the master bedroom" where she kept some of her belongings.6 He 
described Ms. Sunday's demeanor during their conversation as "fairly - I would say 
calm." (Tr.Vol.I, p.198, L.24 - p.201, L.4.) No State witness saw Ms. Sunday anywhere 
but in the living room on the day the warrant was served. (See general/yTr.) Detective 
Brockbank further testified that Bethany Dinacola, who was found in the master 
bathroom at the time that the warrant was executed, admitted to owning "the meth 
pipe." Getting into or out of the master bathroom requires walking through the master 
bedroom. (TrVol.Il, p.148, L.19 - p.150, L.2.) 
2 The residue on the spoon was tested for the presence of heroin and 
methamphetamine, and came back with a result of "no controlled substance detected." 
(TrVol.Il, p.154, L.15 - p.156, L.10.) 
3 Later testing established that the baggie contained methamphetamine. (TrVol.Il, p.83, 
L.7-p.102, L.14.) 
4 Neither the pipe nor the residue was tested for the presence of controlled substances. 
(TrVol.Il, p.156, L.14 - p.157, L.19.) 
5 Four volumes of transcripts were prepared for appeal. The first, covering the first day 
of the jury trial, will be cited as "TrVol.l." The second, covering the second day of the 
jury trial and a hearing on post-trial motions, will be cited as "TrVol.Il." The third, 
covering the sentencing hearing, will be cited as "TrVol.Ill." The fourth, covering the 
hearing held on the motion for new trial and prepared in response to a Motion to 
Augment and to Suspend, will be cited as "TrVoI.IV." 
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The defense called several witnesses. The first, Paul Reid, testified that 
Ms. Sunday had been staying in the home, owned by his stepfather, for "just about a 
week or so," and that she and a man he knew as "Monkey" were staying in the master 
bedroom. It was his belief that the contraband located in the master bedroom belonged 
to Monkey. He knew Ms. Sunday to be a cigarette smoker, and testified that she 
smoked "Camel Crushes." When asked, on cross-examination, why he had not told 
anyone that Monkey was responsible for the items found in the master bedroom, he 
replied, "I was never asked." (Tr.Vol.lI, p.123, L.3 - p.128, L.18.) 
The next witness, Tyler Nourse, Ms. Sunday's son, testified that he was living in 
the home at the time the search warrant was executed. He said that Monkey, also 
known to him as Hannibal, was staying in the master bedroom and had been for three 
or four days, while his mother had only been staying in the master bedroom for one day. 
With respect to the contraband found in the master bedroom, he explained that "a girl 
named Beth claimed that those items were hers." Mr. Nourse further testified that he 
had placed his mother's wallet in the master bedroom for safekeeping after taking it out 
of a Chevrolet Blazer that was being used by "a lot of people there." (Tr.vol.ll, p.130, 
L.8 - p.134, L.22.) 
Ms. Sunday requested that the district court provide the jury with two instructions. 
The first, Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 305, provides, "In every crime of public offense 
there must exist a union or joint operation of act and [intent] [or] [criminal negligence]." 
ICJI 305 (brackets in original). The second was a statement that "mere proximity to 
contraband cannot establish constructive possession .... " Ultimately, the district court 
6 Other than the wallet and driver's license found on the bed, Detective Brockbank 
testified that he didn't know what items in the room belonged to Ms. Sunday. (Tr. Vo 1.1 , 
p.218, Ls.2-11.) 
3 
declined to give either of Ms. Sunday's requested instructions. (Tr.vol.ll, p.170, L.13 -
p.176, L.2S.) 
Following submission of the case to the jury, it returned with verdicts of guilty on 
the charges of possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) and 
possession of drug paraphernalia, and not guilty on the charge of possession of a 
controlled substance (marijuana).7 (Tr.vol.ll, p.217, L.11 - p.218, L.3.) On the charge 
of possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), the district court imposed 
a unified sentence of six years, with two and one-half fixed, suspended in favor of a six 
year term of probation (Tr.vol.lll, p.31, L.17 - p.32, L.23), while on the charge of 
possession of drug paraphernalia, the district court imposed a one hundred dollar fine. 
(Tr.Vol.Ill, p.43, Ls.16-19.) Ms. Sunday filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the entry of 
the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.193-97.) 
7 Defense counsel made several post-verdict motions, including an untimely motion for 
mistrial, a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (which the district court 
properly treated as a Rule 29 motion), and a motion for new trial based on prosecutorial 
misconduct. (Tr.vol.ll, p.221, L.24 - p.223, L.9; R., pp.107-18.) The denials of the 
motions for mistrial and for new trial are not being appealed, and the subject of the Rule 
29 motion is addressed in part I, infra, through a sufficiency argument. 
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ISSUES 
1. Was the evidence sufficient to support Ms. Sunday's conviction for possession of 
a controlled substance (methamphetamine)? 
2. Did the district court err in refusing to provide Ms. Sunday's requested jury 
instructions? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Evidence Was Insufficient To Support Ms. Sunday's Conviction For Possession Of 
A Controlled Substance (Methamphetamine) 
A. Introduction 
The State failed to present sufficient evidence to establish, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that Ms. Sunday possessed a controlled sUbstance (methamphetamine). 
Specifically, the State failed to establish that Ms. Sunday had knowledge of the 
presence of methamphetamine, let alone constructively possessed it, that was 
discovered in a closed cigarette pack found in the master bedroom of the house. As 
such, Ms. Sunday's conviction for possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine) must be vacated, with the matter remanded for entry of a judgment 
of acquittal on the charge. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review for an appellate court regarding the sufficiency of the 
evidence to sustain a conviction was set forth in State v. Peite, 122 Idaho 809, 823 
(Ct. App. 1992), in which the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that: 
A conviction will not be set aside where there is substantial evidence upon 
which any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. On appeal, we construe all facts, 
and inferences to be drawn from those facts, in favor of upholding the 
jury's verdict. Where there is competent although conflicting evidence to 
sustain the verdict, we will not reweigh the evidence or disturb the verdict. 
Id. (citations omitted). "For evidence to be substantial, it must be of sufficient quality 
that reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion." State v. Johnson, 131 Idaho 
808, 809 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing Bott v. Idaho State Bldg. Auth., 128 Idaho 580, 586 
(1996». 
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C. The Evidence Was Insufficient To Support A Conviction For Possession Of A 
Controlled Substance (Methamphetamine) 
As relevant to the possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) 
charge, the evidence adduced at trial established that a small baggie containing 
suspected methamphetamine8 and a suspected methamphetamine pipe were found in a 
closed pack of "Camel 99's" cigarettes located on a camping chair in the master 
bedroom. On the bed in the same room was a purse, next to which was a wallet 
containing Ms. Sunday's identification. (TrVol.I, p.127, L.10 - p.128, L.22; State's 
Exhibit Nos. 1, 3, and 4.) 
Ms. Sunday was one of four or five people found in the house during the 
execution of the search warrant. In speaking with her, Detective Brockbank learned that 
she had been staying in the master bedroom where she kept some of her belongings.9 
Detective Brockbank described Ms. Sunday's demeanor during their conversation as 
"fairly - I would say calm." (TrVoU, p.198, L.24 - p.201, LA.) No State witness saw 
Ms. Sunday anywhere but in the living room on the day the warrant was served, and 
there was no testimony presented that the pack of "Camel 99's" was in the master 
bedroom at a time when Ms. Sunday was in the bedroom. Furthermore, no testimony 
was presented that the pack of "Camel 99's" was tested for fingerprints or other 
evidence that Ms. Sunday ever exercised any control over the pack. (See generally 
Trs.) Finally, Detective Brockbank testified that Bethany Dinacola was found in the 
8 Later testing established that the baggie contained methamphetamine. (Tr.Vol.", 
~.83, L.7 - p.102, L.14.) 
Aside from the wallet and driver's license found on the bed and the legal paperwork 
found in a dresser drawer, Detective Brockbank could not identify what other items in 
the room, if any, belonged to Ms. Sunday. (TrVoU, p.141, L.20 - p.143, L.3; p.218, 
Ls.2-11.) 
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master bathroom 10 at the time that the warrant was executed, and that she admitted to 
owning "the meth pipe.,,11 (Tr.vol./I, p.148, L.19 - p.149, L.22.) 
Paul Reid testified that Ms. Sunday had been staying in the home, owned by his 
stepfather, for "just about a week or so," and that she and a man he knew as "Monkey" 
were staying in the master bedroom. He believed that the contraband located in the 
master bedroom belonged to Monkey. He knew Ms. Sunday to be a cigarette smoker, 
and that she smoked "Camel Crushes."12 When asked, on cross-examination, why he 
had not told anyone that Monkey was responsible for the items found in the master 
bedroom, he replied, "I was never asked." (Tr.vol.ll, p.123, L.3 - p.128, L.18.) 
Tyler Nourse, Ms. Sunday's son, testified that he was living at the home at the 
time the search warrant was executed. He said that Monkey, also known to him as 
Hannibal, was staying in the master bedroom and had been for three or four days, while 
his mother had only stayed in the master bedroom for one day. When asked about 
ownership of the contraband found in the master bedroom, he explained that "a girl 
named Beth claimed that those items were hers." Mr. Nourse also testified that he 
moved his mother's wallet from a Chevrolet Blazer to the master bedroom because the 
Blazer was being used by "a lot of people there," causing him to fear that it might get 
stolen. (Tr.vol./I, p.130, L.8 - p.134, L.22.) 
A number of Idaho cases have addressed what constitutes constructive 
possession of drugs or other contraband. In order to be found guilty on a constructive 
possession theory, the State must prove that the defendant had both knowledge of, and 
10 The only way to enter the master bathroom is by going through the master bedroom. 
(Tr.vol./I, p.149, L.20 - p.150, L.2.) 
11 The only "meth pipe" discussed at trial was the one found in the pack of "Camel 99's." 
(See generally Trs.) 
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control over, the contraband. See State v. Warden, 97 Idaho 752,754 (1976) ("[W]here 
as here defendant is in non-exclusive possession of the premises upon which drugs 
were found there can be no legitimate inference that he knew of the drugs and had 
control of them in the absence of other circumstances such as incriminating statements 
which tend to support such inference.") (citations omitted); State v. Garza, 112 Idaho 
776, 778 (Ct. App. 1987), ("Where, as here, the question is one of constructive 
possession, the state must prove that the defendant had both knowledge and control of 
the drugs."); State v. Vinton, 110 Idaho 832,834 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that, although 
the State "established the existence of cultivated marijuana and the status of the 
Vintons as joint owners of the property . . . [t]hat, in our view does not constitute 
substantial evidence to uphold the conviction of either defendant individually."). 
In State v. Burnside, 115 Idaho 882 (Ct. App. 1989), the Court of Appeals had to 
determine, inter alia, whether there was substantial evidence to support the jury's guilty 
verdict on a charge of possession of psilocybin mushrooms with the intent to deliver. Id. 
at 885. The case began when the police, armed with a warrant to search Burnside's car 
for evidence of methamphetamine dealing, approached him and a passenger while they 
were eating in a restaurant. 13 During the search of the car, the police discovered both 
methamphetamine and psilocybin mushrooms. Burnside was charged with, and 
convicted of, possession of psilocybin mushrooms with intent to deliver and possession 
of methamphetamine. 14 Id. at 883. 
12 As noted above, the contraband in this case was found in a pack of "Camel 99's," not 
a pack of "Camel Crushes." (State's Exhibit Nos. 1, 3, and 4.) 
13 Nothing in the opinion indicates that the police had ever observed the person eating 
with Burnside as a passenger in the vehicle. 
14 Burnside did not appeal the possession of methamphetamine conviction on 
sufficiency grounds. Burnside, 115 Idaho at 883. 
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The Court of Appeals noted that, in order to prove that Burnside possessed the 
psilocybin mushrooms, the State had to establish that he was "aware the mushrooms 
were in his car and that he exercised dominion or control over them." Id. at 885. It 
noted that "the jury could not infer constructive possession from the mere fact that 
Burnside occupied, with a passenger, the automobile in which the drugs were seized." 
Id. (citing State v. Warden, 97 Idaho 752 (1976)). The Court explained that, "in order to 
prevail, the state had to offer evidence which established that Burnside, individually, 
knew of the illegal drugs and that he exercised dominion over them." Burnside, 115 
Idaho at 885. 
In concluding that the State had not met its burden, the Court of Appeals 
analyzed the relevant facts: 
The mushrooms were discovered in a black vinyl bag in Burnside's· 
automobile. When the police began their search of the car, Burnside told 
the officers that the bag was not his. At trial, Burnside's passenger, Redd, 
repeatedly declared that he, and not Burnside, owned the mushrooms. 
Evidence suggested that Burnside may have sold the mushrooms to 
Redd, several hours earlier, in a motel room. The mushrooms later were 
packaged for delivery. However, Redd claimed at trial, that he, and not 
Burnside, had packaged the mushrooms. When asked if he had 
packaged the mushrooms for Burnside, Redd stated that he could not 
remember. 
The evidence does not establish that Burnside exercised dominion and 
control over the mushrooms, when in the car. The state failed to rebut 
Redd's claim of sole ownership ... Burnside's remark to the police, that 
the black bag was not his, suggests he probably knew the drugs were in 
his car. The motel sale also indicates Burnside's knowledge. However, 
neither piece of evidence establishes control. We find an absence of 
evidence on this element of the offense. 
Id. at 885-86. 
In the instant case, none of the evidence presented at trial established that 
Ms. Sunday physically possessed the cigarette pack in which the methamphetamine 
was discovered. As such, the only basis for conviction was under a theory of 
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constructive possession. As in Burnside, the controlled substance was in a location 
accessible to someone other than Ms. Sunday, and was concealed from view inside a 
closed container, for which Ms. Sunday did not admit ownership. Furthermore, a 
person found in a room adjacent to where the controlled substance was discovered (in a 
place that was only accessible by going through the master bedroom), Bethany 
Dinacola, acknowledged ownership of the pipe located in the cigarette pack. Finally, 
the State presented no evidence that the cigarette pack was in the master bedroom 
prior to the execution of the search warrant, let alone at a time when Ms. Sunday was 
present in the bedroom. Because the State failed to present any evidence that 
Ms. Sunday knew of the presence of the methamphetamine, let alone exercised 
dominion over it, it failed to establish that Ms. Sunday constructively possessed it. 
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine) must be vacated, with this matter remanded for entry of a judgment 
of acquittal on the charge. 
II. 
The District Court Erred When It Refused To Provide Ms. Sunday's Requested Jury 
Instructions 
A. Introduction 
Ms. Sunday asserts that the district court erred when it refused to provide the jury 
with two instructions that she requested. Because both instructions properly stated the 
law, and the substance of the requested instructions is not contained in the instructions 
that were provided to the jury, she respectfully requests that this Court vacate her 
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convictions for possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) 15 and 
possession of drug paraphernalia and remand this matter for a new trial. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In determining whether a defendant's requested instruction should have been 
given, the appellate court "must examine the instructions that were given and the 
evidence that was adduced at trial." State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873, 881 (1987). "[T]he 
refusal to give a particular requested instruction is not erroneous where the substance 
of the proposed instruction is covered elsewhere in the instructions given." Watson v. 
Navistar Int'I Transp. Corp., 121 Idaho 643,678 (1992) (citations omitted). 
C. The District Court Erred When It Refused To Provide Ms. Sunday's Requested 
Jury Instructions 
Idaho Code § 19-2132(a), in relevant part, provides: 
In charging the jury, the court must state to them all matters of law 
necessary for their information. Either party may present to the court any 
written charge and request that it be given. If the court thinks it correct 
and pertinent, it must be given; if not, it must be refused. 
I.C. § 19-2132(a). "A defendant is entitled to an instruction on his legal theory of the 
case where there is some evidence in support of that theory." State v. Evans, 119 
Idaho 383,385 (Ct. App. 1991). 
Ms. Sunday requested that the jury be given two jury instructions. The first, 
Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 305, provides, "In every crime of public offense there 
must exist a union or joint operation of act and [intent] [or] [criminal negligence]." ICJI 
305 (brackets in original). The second involved informing the jury that "mere proximity 
15 Obviously, Ms. Sunday's claim of instructional error with respect to the possession of 
a controlled substance (methamphetamine) charge will be moot if this Court grants her 
the relief requested in part I, supra. 
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to contraband cannot establish constructive possession .... " Ultimately, the district 
court declined to give either of the requested instructions. (Tr.Vol.Il, p.170, L.13 -
p.176, L.25.) 
In refusing to give ICJI 305, the district court reasoned that the "instruction is for 
general intent crimes," and one of the charges in the case, possession of drug 
paraphernalia, "is a specific intent crime, and that I don't believe that that instruction is 
appropriate for that crime. And I think it would be confusing to try and - we'd have to 
come up with a whole series of instructions to say what that applies to." (Tr.vol. II , 
p.170, Ls.13-24.) 
Defense counsel objected, arguing that Idaho Code § 19-2132 required that the 
jury '''be instructed in all matters of law necessary for their information.'" (Tr.vol.lI, 
p.171, LS.3-6 (quoting I.C. § 19-2132).) He went on to argue that the two charges of 
possession of a controlled substance were general intent crimes, and that it was, 
therefore, "appropriate to give an instruction when this is a general intent violation." 
(Tr.volll, p.171, Ls.7-22.) In response, the district court reiterated its earlier comments, 
noting that because possession of drug paraphernalia was a specific intent crime, "[a1nd 
the annotations on this instruction in IDJI [sic1 say that it should not be given in specific 
intent crimes . . . I think it would be confusing to the jury to give instructions as to 
specific intent and give this also." (Tr.vol.lI, p.171, L.23 - p.172, L.4.) Defense counsel 
reiterated the "necessity for this general intent" to be proven with respect to the two 
possession charges. (Tr.vol.lI, p.172, Ls.5-7.) 
Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 305 is based on Idaho Code § 18-114, which 
provides, "[i]n every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation, 
of act and intent, or criminal negligence." I.C. § 18-114. The Idaho Supreme Court has 
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held that such an instruction "is and should be generally given." State v. Baldwin, 69 
Idaho 459, 464 (1949). However, when a specific intent crime is charged, and the jury 
is properly instructed as to that charge, the failure to give such an instruction does not 
constitute reversible error. Id. at 465-66. When it comes to general intent crimes, H[t]he 
intent required by I.C. § 18-114 is not the intent to commit a crime but is merely the 
intent to knowingly perform the interdicted act or by criminal negligence the failure to 
perform the required act." State v. Dolsby, 143 Idaho 352, 355 (Ct. App. 2006) (citation 
omitted). 
The remaining proposed instruction, "that 'mere proximity to contraband cannot 
establish constructive possession,'" is an accurate statement of the law in Idaho. See 
Warden, 97 Idaho at 754 ("It is further clear that in the absence of other circumstances 
evidence showing merely presence at the time of drug use is insufficient to support and 
establish conviction for the crime of possession."); Garza, 112 Idaho at 778 ("Mere 
proximity cannot establish constructive possession.") (citing Warden); State v. Fairchild, 
121 Idaho 960, 968-69 (Ct. App. 1992) (finding no error in instructing the jury that, inter 
alia, "[m]ere proximity to the controlled substance cannot establish constructive 
possession"). Furthermore, the substance of the requested instruction was not covered 
elsewhere in the instructions that were given. With respect to possession, the jury was 
only instructed, 
A person has possession of something if the person knows of its presence 
and has physical control of it, or has the power and intention to control it. 
More than one person can be in possession of something if each knows of 
its presence and has the power and intention to control it. 
(TrVol.lI, p.181, Ls.9-15.) 
That Ms. Sunday's theory of the case would have been supported by giving both 
requested instructions, thus establishing the prejudice she suffered from the district 
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court's refusal to give the instructions, can be seen from an examination of her closing 
argument. That argument focused on several issues, one of which was whether the 
State had established that Ms. Sunday knowingly possessed the items in question. 
Specifically, with respect to the contraband found in the bedroom, defense counsel 
argued, "[t]hey found a wallet in the room, so they want you to believe, based upon that, 
that [the contraband in the bedroom] belongs to her. That's not possession. We have 
no evidence of knowledge. We have no evidence of intent." (TrVol.ll, p.200, L.21 -
p.201, L.11 (emphasis added).) Defense counsel also argued that possession required 
more than showing mere proximity, in that the State had to establish that a person 
"must know of its presence and have physical control of it, or have the power and 
intention to control it ... there's nothing that says, if you're close to it, you're guilty. 
Mere proximity is not enough." (Tr.Vol.lI, p.199, Ls.2-20 (emphasis added).) Additional 
prejudice from the refusal to give ICJI 305 can be determined from the fact that one of 
the offenses for which Ms. Sunday was found guilty, the only felony offense charged, 
was a general intent crime, along with the Idaho Supreme Court's holding that language 
similar to that contained in ICJI 305 "is and generally should be given," and the fact that 
the substance of the instruction was not covered elsewhere in the instructions. 
In light of the arguments set forth above, Ms. Sunday asserts that the district 
court erred when it refused to provide the requested instructions. As such, her 
convictions for possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) 16 and 
possession of drug paraphernalia must be vacated, with this case remanded for a new 
trial at which the jury is properly instructed. 
16 Given the Idaho Supreme Court's reasoning in Baldwin, Ms. Sunday does not assert 
that the error in refusing to give ICJI 305 prejudiced her with respect to the specific 
intent crime of possession of drug paraphernalia. 
15 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Ms. Sunday respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate her conviction for possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) and 
remand this matter for entry of a judgment of acquittal. In the alternative, due to 
instructional error, she respectfully requests that this Court vacate her conviction for 
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) and remand this matter for a 
new trial on that charge. With respect to the charge of possession of drug 
paraphernalia, Ms. Sunday respectfully requests that this Court vacate her conviction 
and remand this matter for a new trial on that charge. 
DATED this 2ih day of December, 201 
SPENCER J. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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